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Equity
Defeasance Parties:
Will The Real AAA Please Stand Up
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| Our firm
recently assisted in an effort to structurally upgrade an Equity Defeasance
Party which had fallen below the documentation requirements for continued
participation in a Leasehold Transaction. The documentation was clear as
to the steps to be taken in the event of a downgrade; however, the implementation
was a more complicated issue. |
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| Typical
transaction documentation requires that the non-complying Defeasance Party
be replaced with a complying party, as defined by the transaction documentation.
The critical issue faced in the transaction was the breakage costs. |
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| The selection
of an Equity Defeasance Party should be clearly understood by all parties
as to its long term affects on a transaction. A Defeasance Party can be
a corporation, bank, insurance company, etc. to whom an equity party (lessor)
or lender has entrusted a present value sum of money at a defined interest
rate for usually long periods of time (15 years or greater). That present
value sum will grow to equal a future value obligation of a lessee/borrower.
The Defeasance structure is utilized to assist in the tax efficiency, credit
strengthening or the removal from an obligor's balance sheet, of a large
future purchase obligation or balloon loan repayment. The Defeasance Obligation
has taken the technical name of a Guaranteed Investment Contract (GIC),
Payment Undertaking Agreement (PUA) etc. |
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| The Defeasance
Party is important and should carry a true AAA rating as one does not wish
to be concerned with this party's credit rating, as most transactions that
utilize a defeasance structure will have other structural complication that
are, in some manner, utilizing a defeasance structure to simplify the transaction
or relieve credit weakness in a transaction participant. The structural
issues may be centered around the international cross boarder nature of
the transaction itself or the international credit nature of the lessee/borrower
etc. |
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| Given the
falling interest rate environment over the last year or two, the original
defeasance rate carried a higher coupon than would be available in today's
market; therefore, breakage costs would be substantial. To avoid these substantial
breakage costs, the alternative considered was to attain a "credit wrap"
for the downgraded party. Easier said than done. |
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| The objective
was to attain a "credit wrap" (enhancement) for a recently down graded party
that would be: |
1) long
term in duration (15 years or greater) and
2) have substantial single issuer exposure, |
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an art versus a science. The considered "conventional market", the monoline
credit enhancement insurer, presented challenges in that: |
1) Single
issue "wraps" are not the norm, unless structured so from the inception
of the transaction;
2) Term is an issue. Leaseholds, OFSCs etc. are long term in nature (greater
than 15 years); and
3) The large single issuer exposure customary in the lease finance markets
are considered large by this market. |
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| These challenges,
plus the issue of understanding the nature of these Leasehold and Defeasance
products, are not faced in the normal course of business for the monoline
insurers. Securitizations are their market: issues are medium term financings,
credit exposures are diversified and issues are rather homogenized in nature.
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| The intense
rating agency portfolio scrutiny placed on these monolines, especially for
a recently downgraded large single issue, makes execution difficult at best.
A further downgrade of the newly "enhanced" issue, or the specter of further
"event risk", could cause the insurer to incur further capital charge assessments,
the ultimate nightmare for the any general purpose insurance or monoline
insurance entity. |
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| The alternative
market available to our firm was the credit swap derivative market. This
market is: |
- Not yet a mature
market with great liquidity or depth,
- The pricing is
volatile,
- Long term (greater
than seven/ten years) availability is thin and
- The size of trades
is relatively small compared to the demands of a Leasehold Transaction.
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| The solution
will be time consuming and absorb finite resources for which there will
be no consummate reward for the original placement agent or ultimate equity
participant, who viewed the original Equity Defeasance Party as a "AAA risk
free" entity. |
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| All this
leads our firm to recommend that when selecting an Equity Defeasance Party..............
chose carefully. |
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Defeasance
Parties
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| The three
most common defeasance alternatives are: |
1) direct
US government treasury obligations,
2) obligations issued by AAA rated insurance companies, and
3) Derivative Products Companies (DPCs). These alternatives present increased
rate alternatives/benefits which enhance transaction yields. They also present
increased exposure in their structural and credit aspects to either the
AAA insurance company or the DPC. |
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| The use
of direct US Government Treasury obligations speaks for itself, the use
of US government agency or agency guaranteed issues may require a bit more
due diligence. The credit and structural makeup of AAA rated insurance companies
is well documented. What is the insurance company's: |
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- Loss ratio;
- How well reserved
is the insurer;
- How highly leveraged
is the balance sheet;
- What are the quality
of the insurer's earnings;
- What is the quality
of the investment portfolio as this is the true measure of the insurer's
liquidity and a strong driver in its ability to meet policy claims.
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| The remainder
of this article will focus on the structural aspects of Derivative Product
Company (DPC). |
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| The use
of Derivative Products Companies (DPC) is a recent phenomena as is the Leasehold
or Service Contract transaction. The first DPC was created in 1985 by Prudential
Global Funding. The next by AIG Financial Products in 1987. The importance
of counterparty credit risk was driven home by the 1990 bankruptcy of Drexel
Burnham Lambert. The Structured DPCs were created between 1991 and 1995.
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| Derivative
Products Companies (DPC) are segmented into one of three corporate entities:
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1) A Continuing
Vehicle,
2) A Termination Vehicle or
3) A Guaranteed Structure. |
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| In the
Continuing and Termination structures the DPC is the counterparty. The Guaranteed
entity, in general has, the parent as the counterparty with the DPC guaranteeing
the parent/sponsor. |
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| The ultimate
risks in the DPC entities are: 1) credit risk and 2) market risk (rate movement,
currency movements etc.). |
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| The two
most common vehicles are the Continuing Vehicle and the Termination Vehicle.
The difference between these two entities lies in the manner in which they
are unwound in the event pre-agreed upon "trigger" events occur: the DPC
or parent/sponsor default, downgrades of the DPC or parent/sponsor. |
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| The use
of these DPC vehicles are heavily reliant on their Sponsor/Parent organizations.
In general, for every derivative contract they enter into, they enter into,
or must enter into, a mirror transaction with the sponsor/parent. This is
how DPC are insulated from the market risk - this market risk is passed
on to the sponsor/parent. The credit risk cannot fully be "mirrored" into
the parent/sponsor and is mitigated through econometric credit models which
dictate the credit reserves required for the swap portfolio on a daily basis.
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| This raises
the questions of what happens if the parent/sponsor or DPC encounters financial
stress. If certain trigger events related to the sponsor/parent or DPC occur,
the Continuing Vehicle DPC ceases to write new business and its management
is handed over to a third party and hopefully the swap portfolio is liquidated
over time in an orderly manner. In the event of a "trigger" event for a
Termination Vehicle, the Termination Vehicle is terminated, swap positions
are "valued" and the portfolio is terminated. A "trigger" event in either
the DPC or parent/sponsor leading to the DPC no longer being a AAA rated
entity may occur if the parent/sponsor is unable to post required collateral
the mirror transactions. Given the capital base and collateral requirements,
however, the DPC should not have a problem honoring its obligations. While
it appears these DPCs may deserve their AAA ratings, from a default perspective,
they do not (in our firm's opinion) deserve them when it comes to workout
risk or what we call "brain damage" risk. On page 29 of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Economic Policy Review (April 1996) article on DPCs ("Risk
Management by Structured Derivative Product Companies"), it states: |
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"Even when
derivative customers value an intermediary's triple-A rating, they may not
regard a structured DPC's rating as the equal of other triple-A ratings.
The DPC's rating may be differently regarded because the workout risk of
such a DPC corresponds more closely to the parent's typically single-A rating."
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| While the
DPCs themselves may have parent company "mirror" safeguards and the Equity
Defeasance Contracts have safeguards, such as collateral requirements or
replacement mechanics in the event of downgrades, no one really wishes to
exercise those remedies. As we understand the DPC structures, the risk of
having to workout the equity defeasance contract is based upon the credit
of the parent/sponsor. From historical data published by S&P, an "A" credit
is 2.2 times more likely to default on a debt obligation over a 15 year
period than a "AAA" credit. We assume that both lessors and lessees would
prefer to not have to analyze the equity defeasance parties and contracts
between closing and the purchase option date and would find such a workout
to be, at a minimum inconvenient. There also may be an issue related to
the fact that if the parent/sponsor does have financial problems, the Equity
Defeasance Contract is likely to be the last DPC obligation outstanding
since most conventional derivative contracts are less than 10 years in duration.
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| Our firm
realizes that the ultimate decision concerning how to handle the equity
defeasance in a transaction is made by the lessor and lessee and that there
are numerous trade-offs. We want to make sure that you and your clients
understand the differences between entities such as DPCs and true AAA rated
insurance companies when making these decisions. Understanding the nature
and structure of a AAA rated DPC may be as difficult as understanding the
Leasehold or Service Contract Transaction itself. |
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Thomas A. Orofino
is a Managing Partner of Collateral Guaranty LLC Westport Ct (203.227.7080).
He is responsible for the marketing and product design of residual value
insurance products and services worldwide.
Mr. Orofino is a graduate of Villanova University where he earned his
BA in Economics.
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